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Good Publicity: The Legitimacy of Public Communication of Deliberation 
Abstract 
Although deliberative democratic theory values the principle of publicity, few empirical 
studies systematically assess the public communication of civic groups that deliberate over 
policy.  The proliferation of such groups in contemporary politics, and of uncertainty about their 
legitimacy, suggests the need for such study. Drawing on contemporary deliberative theory, we 
derive a set of Legitimate Publicity Indicators for assessing how well groups report their 
deliberative processes and policy conclusions. We demonstrate the reliability and utility of these 
measures in a comparative content analysis of the final reports of three common kinds of 
deliberative bodies – a government-stakeholder task force, an activist strategy group, and a 
citizen consensus conference. We conclude by suggesting an agenda for further research on the 
perceived legitimacy of publicity about deliberative processes, outcomes, and impacts on the 
policy process. 
Introduction 
There is growing interest in a broad range of forums that incorporate citizen deliberation 
in the formation of policy recommendations and even in enacting reforms directly.  These efforts 
aim to enhance democratic participation and public opinion formation, institutional 
accountability, and the legitimacy of the policy-making process in contemporary pluralist 
democracies (Fung & Wright, 2003; Gastil & Levine, 2005).  Such groups deliberate, rather than 
engaging in other forms of communication, when they partake in “debate and discussion aimed 
at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise 
preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants” 
(Chambers, 2003, p. 309).  Because deliberation is oriented toward arriving at positions on issues 
  
or making decisions about them, it can be distinguished from dialogue, which simply asks 
participants to achieve greater shared understanding and mutual tolerance, and from discussion 
that aims only to improve participants’ civic capacities (Cramer Walsh, 2007; Thompson, 
2008).
1
  In this definition of deliberation, participants exchange views in order to arrive at well-
informed individual positions or group decisions, justify their conclusions to others who are 
affected by them, and reveal the process by which the group reached those conclusions.   
Given the growth of forums for engaging the public in policy deliberation, it is surprising 
how little empirical research addresses the legitimacy of how civic groups disclose their 
deliberative process and express their decisions. Instead, much of the empirical research 
examines how well such groups talk among themselves according to normative criteria for good 
deliberation (for summaries, see Fung, 2003; Gastil, 2008; Thompson, 2008).  One major strand 
of this research examines how elements of design and control (such as recruitment of participants 
or decision-making rules) shape conditions of discursive equality, reciprocity, or transparency.  
Another main strand focuses on deliberative discourse, measuring how well participants engage 
in reason-giving, consideration of counter-arguments, orientation to the common good, and other 
criteria for high-quality deliberation.  Each line of research may attempt to explain deliberation’s 
perceived legitimacy by others and its effectiveness at influencing policy. 
Unfortunately, this often involves skipping over what is likely an important step: the 
reporting of deliberative groups’ decision-making process and recommendations to 
policymakers, citizens, and the news media.  Because the whole polity cannot directly participate 
in even the most ambitious deliberative event, the perceived legitimacy and influence of 
deliberative groups depends in part on how they communicate with outsiders.  Yet this aspect of 
deliberation is a largely unexplored black box in studies of deliberative civic forums.  Research 
  
on journalistic reporting on deliberation suggests that the news media often simplify, 
sensationalize, or ignore much deliberation (Page, 1996; Parkinson, 2006a, 2006b). Therefore, 
deliberators must improve how they communicate both to the news media and “around” them 
(i.e., directly to the public and decision-makers). 
We focus on defining legitimate publicity by civil society assemblies and quasi-
governmental forums that take place outside of traditional state structures, where the lines of 
authorization, accountability, and authority are less firmly established in democratic theory and 
practice. Examples of the kinds of civic forums in which we are interested include stakeholder 
task forces and commissions appointed to advise government; meetings convened by social 
movements and other civil society actors to identify goals and strategies; and meetings that 
assemble a microcosm of a larger public to arrive at policy recommendations (e.g., Citizens 
Juries and Consensus Conferences) or a representation of well-informed public opinion (e.g., 
Deliberative Polls).  At each kind of forum, government officials may participate but they are 
there to engage with a public, whose preferences are expected to be the focus of the event.   
As the prevalence and influence of such forums has grown relative to traditional state 
structures, so has anxiety about their legitimacy.
2
 From the standpoint of deliberative theory, if 
such forums aim to influence policy or public opinion, they should practice publicity unless it 
would defeat the ability to deliberate – for example, by encouraging external coercion of 
participants, such as jurors (Warren, 2007). Thus, our focus is on how organized deliberations 
involving members of the public (as residents, citizens, activists, or stakeholders) should be 
reported, rather than contexts that may not require publicity, such as everyday political talk 
among the public, or forums that simply aim to educate participants or build their civic 
capacities.  
  
In this article, we prepare the ground for research in this underexplored area by deriving a 
set of Legitimate Publicity Indicators (LPI) from contemporary deliberative theory.  We 
demonstrate the LPI’s reliability and utility by comparing the quality of reports on a common 
issue that emerged from three typical kinds of deliberative bodies – a government-led 
stakeholder task force, an activist strategy group, and a citizen consensus conference.  This pilot 
study illustrates how several important questions about deliberative democracy might be 
addressed by opening the black box of communication about deliberation.  Finally, we suggest a 
broader agenda for future research that can assess more systematically how reporting of 
deliberation helps to explain the perceived legitimacy and effects of deliberative groups on 
public opinion and policy making. 
The Importance of Publicity 
Legitimacy is the “moral basis of political authority” (Birch, 1993, p. 32), which 
establishes grounds for why citizens and officials should consent to policy decisions made by 
others.  Because most outsiders cannot directly observe the totality of a deliberative process – 
including the selection of topics and participants, the choice of background information, and 
each moment of the group’s discussions – outsiders must depend on how the group summarizes 
its process and proposals in policy documents, press conferences, and the like.  It is primarily 
through these channels that most policymakers and citizens will be able to assess the legitimacy 
of deliberative decisions and weigh whether to support them. 
The need to achieve external legitimacy is especially important given the “scale problem” 
of deliberation, which has difficulty accommodating more than a small group and allowing for 
meaningful participation by all.  It is not self-evident that non-participants should consent to 
agreements reached in small deliberative policy forums in which the chosen few are not clearly 
  
authorized by the wider public they aim to represent and may not be held sufficiently 
accountable to them (Parkinson, 2006a).  Thus, if such groups aim to influence policy or public 
opinion legitimately, they must not only deliberate well internally, but must also persuade 
onlookers that they have done so. 
Researchers’ lack of attention to external communication is in part a legacy of formative 
theories of deliberative democracy.  Several influential theorists initially grounded deliberation’s 
legitimacy solely in an appropriate discursive process (e.g., Benhabib, 1994; Cohen, 1989), most 
notably Habermas’ (1990) influential discourse ethics.  Critics of proceduralism argue that 
deliberation must also be judged by whether the resulting decisions respect substantive 
principles, such as individual rights to liberty and equality of opportunity (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996).  But legitimacy goes beyond the procedures and outcomes of the deliberating 
group to involve the wider public.  As Mutz argues, “it is difficult to conceive of inherent 
legitimacy benefiting a democratic society without also being perceived as such by its citizens” 
(2008, p. 524).  In sum, if deliberators’ choices flout widely respected norms these decisions may 
be both morally suspect and rejected by public opinion. 
In response to these problems with basing a theory of legitimate decision-making in a 
perfect “micro-deliberative” process (Parkinson, 2006a, p. 6), many theorists now advocate for 
creating a better macro-deliberative system.  This entails improving the quality of deliberation in 
many arenas, from representative government, to consultative bodies, to social movements, 
journalism, and informal political conversation (Gastil, 2008; Habermas, 1996; Mansbridge, 
1999; Thompson, 2008).  In this view, shortcomings in the deliberative quality of any one 
element of the system might be offset by other elements, thereby complementing one another’s 
strengths and balancing one another’s weaknesses.  If such a system is to work, citizens must be 
  
able to forge their opinions in a vibrant public sphere and convey them effectively to other actors 
in the system, while decision-makers must fully explain the bases for their positions to each other 
and to citizens.  Legitimate external communication becomes the glue that holds a deliberative 
political structure together. 
 Such a system must rely heavily on the principle of publicity, which requires that 
deliberative processes and outcomes be made public if they are to be valid (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996, 2004; Parkinson, 2006).  Publicity as accountability encourages deliberators to 
respect and consider others’ arguments more fully and to clarify how the group’s decisions relate 
to others’ positions.  Publicity as education informs onlookers about deliberators’ insights into 
issues, tensions between values, novel re-framings of dilemmas or solutions to problems, 
potential for common ground, and remaining differences. Publicity as transparency allows 
outsiders to give informed and authentic consent to a group’s decisions by assessing the process 
and reasoning that informed the group’s choices.   
The Legitimate Publicity Indicators 
We can derive some of our conceptual and operational measures of legitimate publicity 
about deliberation by adapting criteria that are widely used to assess the internal deliberative 
process of a group.  However deliberative democrats do not share a single vision of deliberative 
quality and researchers have employed a wide range of empirical measures of the concept (for 
summaries, see Haug & Teune, 2008; Lyu, 2008).  In response, we aim to create categories that 
can be employed across studies of publicity for theory building, and to which others can add 
measures to test more specific concepts unique to particular deliberative theories.  As we show 
below, many of these core measures reflect broadly shared values among deliberative theorists 
about what makes for legitimate deliberation, such as arriving at conclusions; supporting them 
  
with reasons, evidence, and normative claims; consideration of opposing views (or reciprocity); 
and transparency about the deliberative process.  Other measures are unique to the moment of 
publicity, such as how faithfully its authors reflect the group’s views.  We organize these 
measures into two broad categories: argumentation (reporting the content of deliberation) and 
transparency (disclosing the deliberative process). 
Argumentation 
When a civic forum reports its conclusions to external audiences, the participants’ 
deliberation is transformed into a kind of argument, which can be assessed using many of the 
categories that are basic both to deliberative democratic theory and to the study of argumentation 
(e.g., Toulmin, 1969).  Deliberation is oriented toward making decisions, which are expressed in 
a group’s conclusions.  These we define as decisions or recommendations that are presented as 
having been endorsed by at least a majority of the deliberators.
3
  Conclusions may involve 
statements of the group’s goals, strategies, solutions, or favored policies.  Conclusions include 
statements about what other people should or must do, and descriptions of what the deliberative 
group or its allies want or seek to do, or are trying to get approved or passed.   
Legitimate public communication of deliberation does not simply list conclusions but 
supports them with reasons.  For many theorists, deliberative democracy’s “first and most 
important characteristic . . . is its reason-giving requirement” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 
3; see also Cohen, 1989; Habermas, 1984-1987).  Conceptually, we define a reason broadly as 
any statement that “answers the ‘why’ question” about the basis for one’s position (Mansbridge, 
2007, p. 261).  Our operational definition of a reason is any statement that explains why a 
conclusion is desirable (fair or effective), but which is not immediately backed by evidence in 
the same sentence (in order to distinguish reasons from evidence, which would otherwise be 
  
difficult to disentangle). We include not only rational argumentation but also affective reasoning, 
which is increasingly recognized as making a valid contribution to deliberation (Gastil, 2008; 
Thompson, 2008).  Reasons include presentations or summary descriptions of events, ideas, and 
needs that justify conclusions.  
 Good deliberation is also based on broad access to information (Gastil, 2008).  In 
publicity, information is presented as evidence.  Evidence is an especially important kind of 
reasoning that consists of the “empirical or quasi-empirical claims on which moral reasoning 
often depends to achieve its practical purposes” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 56) – a 
definition that reflects the broad range of evidence that deliberative democrats now accept as 
contributing to rational discourse (Ryfe, 2005). We define evidence operationally as any 
reasoning that is accompanied with immediate backing (in the same sentence or in a footnote) by 
statistics, research findings, stories or anecdotes, personal testimony, or analogies or contrasts to 
actual events.  These kinds of backing distinguish evidential statements (e.g., “75 percent of 
Americans believe X will solve this problem”) from other kinds of reasoning (e.g., a non-
evidentiary reason, such as “X would solve this problem quickly and cheaply”).  
Deliberative legitimacy also depends on making the moral bases of one’s position public.  
The theory of deliberative democracy is, first and foremost, a normative theory about how 
politics ought to be conducted (Thompson, 2008).  The theory’s demand that deliberators support 
their decisions with reasons that can be justified to all who are subject to them stems in part from 
a “commitment [that] entails the integration of substantive moral argument into democratic 
processes” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 50).  In this view, policy analysis, whether 
conducted by experts or citizens, involves clarifying not only strategies but underlying norms, 
which are seen as too often unexamined. Therefore, we code for the presence of conclusions and 
  
reasons that are normative (i.e., which explicitly state why a conclusion or reason is morally 
right, just, or fair) and non-normative (which do not make such appeals). Normative statements 
refer explicitly to individual and group rights, duties, or obligations, or to justice, fairness, or 
morality (including their opposites, such as exploitation, discrimination, or immorality).  
Deliberative publicity also prizes consideration of opposing views, which demonstrates 
that deliberators have considered different positions than the ones they ultimately endorsed 
(Chambers, 2003).  Deliberators who can offer more arguments for and against their position, 
while resolving these differences in favor of their own stance, may be considered to have 
communicated their choices more legitimately than those who mention fewer counter-arguments 
(Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002).  A willingness to engage with opposing views may also reflect 
the sort of civility and mutual respect that normative theorists of deliberation prefer. For us, an 
opposing view includes any conclusion, reason, or evidence that is explicitly presented as 
contradicting one of the deliberative group’s conclusions, reasons, or evidence. 
Because deliberative theorists especially value respectful consideration of alternative 
positions, we also distinguish the level of respect with which opposing views are treated 
(following Steiner, et al., 2004).  Opposing views may be presented as illegitimate when they are 
introduced as unworthy of consideration through attacks on the arguer’s motives (e.g., 
“Companies, who care only about their profits, demand X”), use of negative adjectives or 
adverbs (“Some wrongly call for X”), caricature (“One purported ‘need’ is X”), or other 
pejorative language (including negative language that opponents would not use themselves in 
public to characterize their position).  Opposing views also may be presented neutrally, without 
explicit comment on whether they are worthy of consideration, even if they are ultimately 
rejected (“Some call for X, while others advocate for Y; we think Y is best.”)  Or alternative 
  
perspectives can be presented as legitimate, even if they are not embraced (“We agree with some 
people’s concerns about Y, but we still think that Y is preferable to X.”) 
 High quality reporting of deliberation does not merely include the elements discussed 
above, but makes clear the connections between participants’ conclusions and related reasons, 
evidence, opposing views, and norms.  Therefore, as a threshold measure of coherence, we also 
code for whether each conclusion in the document is supported by at least one reason, piece of 
evidence, and so on, elsewhere in the document.  Because this is a fairly low standard, we also 
offer a summary judgment about the explicitness of the connections between conclusions and the 
other categories in the entire document. This measure focuses on whether the supporting 
elements of argumentation are consistently connected to conclusions proximally (in the same 
section of the document) and logically (related specifically and directly instead of vaguely or 
ambiguously).   
Transparency 
Deliberative bodies also honor publicity by practicing transparency about their process, 
defined as disclosing information about the control, design, intended influence, and evaluation of 
the deliberation, as well as the fidelity of the publicity to the deliberation it represents (these 
categories expand upon Kadlec & Friedman, 2007).  A commitment to transparency is what 
distinguishes deliberative publicity from other kinds of public communication, such as strategic 
rhetoric and public relations. Disclosure is important because the particular designs and 
conditions of deliberative forums can have significant impacts on their perceived legitimacy and 
their policy proposals (Fung, 2003).  Transparency has emerged as especially important to 
scholars and practitioners of citizen deliberation, where it can act as a check on manipulation or 
co-optation of citizen participation by officials and powerful interests (Levine & Nierras, 2007).  
  
Knowing that their deliberations will be made public can also encourage deliberators to respect 
and consider others’ arguments more fully and clarify how the group’s decisions relate to others’ 
positions. Transparency can also check the power of publicity’s authors, who are rarely identical 
with the deliberators themselves. The kinds of coercion that some deliberative theorists fear can 
happen within deliberation can also be committed against the group after the fact by the authors 
of reports – including presenting an illusory consensus, suppression of less powerful members’ 
ways of reasoning and norms, and airbrushing of opposing views and conflict within the group. 
A focus on fidelity also helps us to distinguish the legitimacy of the deliberation itself from the 
quality of the publicity about it.  For example, if a deliberation did not succeed at getting 
participants to discuss opposing views, then the deliberation is to blame, not the publicity 
(although the publicity could be expected to acknowledge this failure).  When these many 
elements of transparency are practiced, it allows outsiders to give informed and authentic consent 
to the group’s process and decisions.  
We operationalize transparency by coding for the presence of disclosures about who 
controls the deliberation, including the mission of the organization(s) that initiated the process, 
their sources of funding, and their organizational partnerships.  We also record revelations about 
the design of the deliberation, including criteria used for selecting and recruiting participants, 
participants’ representativeness of the larger population, the agenda (initial questions or tasks 
presented to participants), the structure and facilitation of deliberation (such as how often, how 
long, and where participants met, and how their conversations were moderated), the deliberative 
format (such as a consensus conference or citizen jury), the decision-rule used to arrive at the 
final conclusions (e.g., consensus or majority rule), and other dynamics of the deliberation (how 
quickly, strongly, and easily the group agreed on conclusions, and any information about 
  
changes in the participants’ opinions or knowledge after deliberating). In addition, disclosures 
about the intended influence of deliberation include their purpose (to spark wider public 
discussion, as binding upon or merely advisory to a specific governing body, etc.), and their 
primary audiences (e.g., ordinary citizens, stakeholder groups, particular government bodies).  
Transparency about evaluation includes formal assessment by participants or others of the 
fairness or effectiveness of the process (including of briefing materials, facilitation, discussion, 
conclusions, etc.) and of participants’ changes in knowledge, attitudes, or dispositions during the 
deliberation.  Practicing fidelity is defined as explicit reporting on the group’s authorization of 
the publicity (the criteria used to decide how the group’s conclusions, reasons, evidence, and 
consideration of opposing views were included in publicity and whether these criteria were 
agreed to by the group as a whole).  Fidelity also involves a measure of authorial accountability 
to the deliberators – a disclosure of whether group members thought the authorizing criteria were 
applied accurately in the final form of the publicity. 
Expectations for Legitimate Publicity 
 How can these measures be used to distinguish more and less legitimate examples of 
deliberative publicity?  Higher quality publicity would involve more comprehensive 
argumentation, which employs each element (conclusions, reasons or evidence, norms, and 
opposing views) at least once, and preferably more often. Argumentation would also be more 
coherent, meaning that more conclusions are supported by at least one reason or piece of 
evidence, norm, and discussion of an opposing view somewhere in the document; and the 
example of publicity as a whole would be structured and worded in a way that clearly links 
conclusions and supporting elements both proximally and logically.  More legitimate publicity 
  
would also be fully transparent by disclosing each element of the deliberation’s control, design, 
intended influence, evaluation, and fidelity.  
Clarifications and Limitations 
It is important to explain why we are not including measures of some common concepts 
in deliberative theory, to clarify some methodological issues, and to note the relationship 
between publicity and effectiveness of policy conclusions. 
Some deliberative democrats may wonder why we have not included statements oriented 
toward the common good or toward achieving consensus as central to legitimate public 
communication of deliberative outcomes.  Inspired by Habermas’s (1984-1987, 1990) early 
communicative ethics, many other empirical studies have focused on these categories, including 
perhaps the most developed coding scheme for the quality of public deliberative talk – the 
Discourse Quality Index developed by Steiner et al. (2004).  However, in contrast to Habermas’s 
initial promotion of appeals to the common good, many deliberative theorists increasingly accept 
that the “articulation of self-interest [has] a legitimate role in democratic deliberation, 
particularly in discussions of fair distribution” (Mansbridge et al., 2006, p. 5). Other theorists 
have leavened the desire for consensus with an appreciation for productive disagreement that 
encourages exploring differences and allows room for negotiating those differences or putting 
them to a majority vote (e.g., Karpowitz & Mansbridge, 2005).  In short, achieving consensus 
and orienting all talk toward the common good do not appear to be consensually accepted 
elements of deliberative theory today.   
Several methodological clarifications are also in order.  First, we are measuring the 
quality of communication about deliberation, not of the group’s deliberation itself.  Excellent 
deliberations may be communicated poorly to the public (e.g., by reporting that reveals nothing 
  
of the group’s reasoning and process) and poor deliberations can appear to be communicated 
well (e.g., by publicity that supplements the group’s actual discussion with reasons it did not 
consider and presents a misleadingly rosy view of its process).  Thus, we are not attempting to 
offer an indirect measure of the legitimacy of a group’s deliberation by coding its final report.  
Second, we are concerned here with the formal aspects of publicity that are widely supported 
within deliberative theory.  Therefore, our measures do not assess the substantive legitimacy of 
publicity; while the LPI can capture whether a report appeals to norms, such as some conception 
of rights or justice, our measures do not attempt to distinguish “good” norms from “bad” ones. 
While deliberative theorists call for grounding decisions in norms, there is less agreement among 
them on the scope of specific rights or principles that decisions must respect.   
Third, while deliberative forums may be publicized through many means – including the 
organizers’ web sites, press releases, and media coverage – we focus on final reports for this 
pilot study because they are the most common form of publicity for all three kinds of forums we 
chose and because they are under the organizers’ control (unlike media coverage, which depends 
on journalistic interpretation).  Because reports represent just one step in the chain of publicity 
from deliberative groups to the media, political forums, and the public, in our conclusion we 
suggest ways of incorporating other forms of publicity into a larger research agenda. 
Fourth, we aim to propose realistic standards for any deliberative publicity by a group 
that seeks to affect public opinion or policy-making, rather than an ideal standard, such as 
Habermas’ (1984-1987) Ideal Speech Situation.  We think that publicity can incorporate each of 
the elements of argumentation and transparency, at least briefly, regardless of the issue, context, 
or audience for the deliberation, unless doing so would expose the participants to external 
pressure that makes deliberation impossible.  For example, in regard to argumentation, even 
  
highly moral issues (such as abortion) involve disputes over evidence (such as when human life 
begins or the experiences of women who have had abortions) and even the most technical issues 
(such as the safety of genetically modified crops) implicate norms (such as the rights of 
consumers to full information about the ingredients in their foods).   
Fifth, while it is possible to aggregate our measures into a single index of legitimate 
publicity in order to compare reports, we are wary of doing so. It may be misleading to assign a 
consistent normative weight to each element of publicity in all contexts.  Thompson (2008) 
argues that aggregating to a single indicator of deliberative quality obscures the distinct strengths 
and weaknesses of different kinds of deliberation, and the same is true for publicity.  For 
example, it may be that a report that boils down a welter of competing policy proposals to a 
relative handful of conclusions, devoting most of its attention to thoughtful explanation of the 
group’s reasons for endorsing them over a few key alternative proposals, is normatively superior 
to a report that lists many more conclusions and opposing views, but reveals little about how the 
group chose between them.   
Finally, while we think that practicing high quality publicity is likely to be necessary for 
most groups to influence future policy decisions, we make no claims that deliberative publicity is 
sufficient to determine policy.  It would be naïve to ignore the role of political expediency, 
including the timing of conclusions to fit windows of opportunity, costs of proposals, fit with 
interests of powerful constituencies, and so on.  But it would also be naïve to assume that 
communicative legitimacy has no bearing on the adoption of conclusions.  Moral authority is 
always a resource in politics (Kratochwil, 1989).  In addition, many elements of legitimate 
publicity overlap with aspects of effective policy analysis and writing. Scholarship on the 
rhetorical aspects of policy analysis (e.g., Fischer, 1995; Majone, 1989) and public policy 
  
textbooks (e.g., Bardach, 2009) emphasize the persuasive value of offering thorough rationales 
for proposals, credible evidence, and clear evaluative criteria (normative reasoning), as well as 
addressing multiple alternative courses of action and trade-offs (i.e., exploring counter-
arguments). 
Reliability and Utility of the LPI 
As an initial demonstration of the reliability and utility of our measures, we tested them 
on a sample of three final reports by deliberative groups that issued conclusions on a common 
issue: how to increase public access to broadband Internet service.  Our research design allowed 
us to compare reports that emerged from three common kinds of deliberative consultative bodies: 
a citizen consensus conference organized by two university centers (Santa Clara University 
Center for Science, Technology, and Society & Broadband Institute of California, 2006); a task 
force of stakeholders from business, philanthropy, and the non-profit sector that was formed to 
advise a municipal government agency (San Francisco Department of Telecommunications and 
Information Services, 2007); and a strategy committee of media activists convened by an 
independent think tank (New America Foundation & Center for International Media Action, 
2006).  Our interviews with the organizers of each group and the reports themselves indicate that 
threshold conditions for deliberation were met in each case, including the presence of 
disagreements (over the agenda, policy goals, strategies, and priorities), at least some 
participants’ openness to revising their preferences, an exchange of reasons for positions, 
eventual agreement on some conclusions, and some basic disclosure of the deliberative process 
in the reports or accompanying web sites.
4
 
These policy documents were chosen in part because they offered rough controls on 
several variables.  The reports focused on a common issue: maximizing public access to 
  
broadband. They were published at a similar moment in the issue’s lifecycle, within the same six 
month period, when there was a common public debate over whether cities should build their 
own broadband networks in order to reach underserved residents, a prospect that was strenuously 
opposed by private Internet service providers as a form of unfair competition by government 
with industry (Hammond & Raphael, 2006).  Each document reported the conclusions of an 
almost identical number of deliberators (12-14 people).  The groups spent a similar amount of 
time in face-to-face discussion (about 15 hours for the citizen conference, 12 for the activist 
group, and 10 for the stakeholder committee), although the activists and stakeholders spent 
additional time conferring via email and conference calls.   
However, these documents were also selected because they offered an opportunity to 
compare reports that emerge from three different models of deliberation that are often 
encountered in the policy making environment.  Distinctions between these models include the 
missions of the sponsoring organizations. The organizers of the consensus conference aimed to 
boost citizen engagement in broadband policy making.  The government agency that convened 
the stakeholder task force articulated a service mission that entailed “empower[ing] people to 
effectively use computers and access the Internet” (SFDTIS, 2007, p. 2). The think tank’s activist 
mission focused on building a coalition of activists for “successful advocacy for 
spectrum/wireless policy in [the public] interest” (NAF/CIMA, 2006, p. 1).5  Not surprisingly, 
each group recruited different participants: citizens; representatives of local businesses, charities, 
and non-profits; and media activists from diverse communities.
6
  The mode of deliberation 
differed as well: the consensus conference and stakeholder task force incorporated public 
hearings, while the activist group did not.  In addition, the stakes in each deliberation were 
different.  Although the consensus conference participants had direct access to planners of a 
  
regional municipal broadband project, they had no formal guarantee of influencing the project. 
Nor were the activists assured that they would have a direct impact on policy. The members of 
the stakeholder task force had the clearest potential to shape policy directly, because they were 
convened by a government agency tasked with increasing broadband access.   
Perhaps most important to our interest in publicity, the decision-making rules for 
adopting conclusions, the authoring process, and the audiences for each report also differed.  In 
the consensus conference, organizers drafted conclusions based on the group’s discussion but all 
participants reviewed and agreed upon the wording of each part of the final report, while in the 
other two cases participants gave input and feedback on drafts of the document but the final 
decisions on adopting and expressing conclusions lay in the hands of the organizers, who were 
ultimately identified as the authors of each report.  The primary audiences for each document 
were also different.  The citizen panel addressed itself to a broad policy making community of 
“government, industry, and advocacy groups working on broadband” 
(http://broadbandforall.org), while the stakeholder report was presented to the public as a city 
planning document, and the activist report aimed to inform fellow “advocates and organizers 
working on issues of community media, technology and telecom” (NAF/CIMA, 2006, p. 2).  
While we will refer to these groups as stakeholder, activist, and citizen deliberators for brevity’s 
sake and because our focus is on analyzing publicity (not the underlying deliberation or the 
impact of process designs), these are shorthand labels for a larger set of differences among the 
groups. 
At the same time, we see these differences as fairly typical of the three kinds of 
deliberative bodies whose reports are examined here and therefore as strengths of the sample 
rather than as shortcomings.  Our inability to isolate the independent effects of each variable that 
  
might have influenced the final reports might be troubling if we aimed to measure the quality of 
the deliberative process indirectly by looking at its outcomes, but we do not.  Instead, we are 
assessing how the deliberative process and conclusions are communicated to wider audiences.  
We are interested in whether our indicators can be used to compare how these reports vary in the 
way that they fulfill our criteria of good publicity and in demonstrating the usefulness of this 
kind of analysis for research on publicity’s role in the larger deliberative system, points to which 
we will return in the conclusion.   
 Our primary aim for the pilot study is to illustrate how analysis of publicity can be used 
to inform debates over the relative value of contributions to democracy by different actors within 
the deliberative system.  Stakeholder groups’ claim to legitimacy stems from representing the 
views of community leaders who represent important constituencies, have policy expertise, and 
are empowered to influence government. Yet critics express doubts that government can act as 
an honest broker among competing stakeholders because official deliberative processes can fail 
to produce agreement on recommendations, result in “back-room” deals that sacrifice the 
interests of non-participants, conceal commitments to values beneath technical language, and co-
opt or ignore the views of the least powerful stakeholders (Hendriks, 2006; Levine & Nierras, 
2007).  Whereas some see social movements as particularly fertile ground for free, authentic, and 
equal civic deliberation that is separate from state and market pressures (e.g., Dryzek, 2000), 
others appeal to a Madisonian fear of faction to raise suspicions that movements and interest 
groups are unlikely to hold themselves accountable to society as a whole and consider alternative 
views because these groups are too narrowly and passionately committed to their own economic 
or ideological pursuits, or too prone to group polarization (e.g., Sunstein, 2005).  If citizen 
forums draw legitimacy from representing enlightened public opinion, skeptics contend that 
  
citizens lack sufficient information, expertise, rationality, and interest in grappling with political 
disagreement to play a constructive role in policy formation. These claims are raised not only by 
advocates of elite democracy (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954) or “stealth 
democracy” (Hibbing & Thiess-Morse, 2002), but sometimes also by social movement activists 
concerned that ineffectual civic forums co-opt and displace civic protest and pressure on elites 
(Hendriks, 2006; Levine & Nierras, 2007). While we cannot generalize from our small sample to 
publicity of all stakeholder, activist, and citizen deliberation, we can show how well the reports 
we analyze address typical concerns about the legitimacy of the deliberative groups, thus 
illustrating one especially important use of our measures. 
Methods 
Each report was analyzed independently by at least two coders in two stages using the 
definitions of our categories introduced above. (Full operational definitions of all coding 
categories can be found in the codebook, available from the authors). In the first stage, each 
sentence in each report was coded into our categories for argumentation (conclusions, reasons, 
etc.) and transparency, yielding a total of 858 total sentences across the reports.  Subject 
headings and subheadings were excluded because their meanings were too fragmentary or 
ambiguous to code reliably, while images were coded along with their explanatory captions as a 
single unit of content.  While we defined our categories to be mutually exclusive (e.g., a 
conclusion was defined differently from a reason), a sentence could be coded as falling into more 
than one category (e.g., as containing both a conclusion and a reason). There were two 
exceptions to this rule. A sentence could not be coded as both a reason and as evidence (because 
we defined a reason as lacking immediate backing in the same sentence and evidence as 
  
accompanied by backing in the same sentence).  Nor could a sentence be coded as “other 
material” and in any additional category. 
In the second stage, a new set of coders assessed each document’s coherence by coding 
whether each conclusion (a total of 330 across the three documents) was linked to a relevant 
reason, evidence statement, norm, and opposing view somewhere in the document, and also by 
making a summary judgment about the document’s coherency as a whole (whether it 
consistently linked conclusions and other elements of argumentation both proximally and 
logically).
7
  Coders also noted the presence or absence of each element of transparency. Over 
two-thirds of all coding was done by six different research assistants, while the rest was 
completed by the authors. 
 Both stages of the content analysis yielded high levels of intercoder reliability (see Table 
1). First, reliability for coding sentences into each category of argumentation (conclusions, 
reasons, etc.) was tested using a sample of approximately 15 percent of the sentences in each 
document.  Almost all of the variables reported here scored at .90 or above across multiple 
indices of intercoder agreement, except for “other material” (.867).8  Second, coders’ ratings for 
coherence (connections between conclusions and the other categories) were examined in a 
sample of approximately 25 percent of the conclusions in each document.  While reliability 
levels for coherence judgments were slightly lower, they continued to meet accepted thresholds 
for high levels of intercoder agreement, especially for exploratory research (Lacy & Riffe, 1996). 
The sample of three documents was too small for a formal test of intercoder reliability on the 
document-level summary measures of coherence, but the coders agreed perfectly on these 
judgments. 




Table 2 presents an overview of our coding for the argumentation categories.  The top 
portion of the table shows the extent to which each of our measures was present in the three 
documents.  Because the activist document was longer than the stakeholder document and citizen 
document, the percentages of each report devoted to conclusions and other categories is more 
revealing of their argumentative emphases than raw counts of sentences.  Significant differences 
emerging from two-tailed difference of proportions tests are bolded, with the appropriate point of 
comparison indicated by the superscript. 
Table 2 around here 
The results highlight several important deficits with respect to our categories of 
legitimate publicity.  Most notably, the citizen report includes no evidence and the stakeholder 
document contains no references to opposing views.  In the case of the citizens, the absence of 
evidence may be partially offset by the report’s relative strength with respect to non-evidentiary 
reasons for conclusions.  The citizen report devoted much more space to reason-giving than did 
the activists and stakeholders, with differences well exceeding standard levels of statistical 
significance.  If we combine reasons and evidence as complementary kinds of explanation for a 
report’s conclusions, we find that even with no evidence, the citizen report still devoted the 
greatest percentage of sentences to providing rationales for its conclusions, significantly 
exceeding both the activists and stakeholders.  
Potential publicity deficits can also be found with respect to both normative statements 
and opposing views. Table 2 shows that in all reports, both kinds of statements were quite rare, 
never exceeding 6 percent of the sentences coded in any document.  The stakeholder report 
  
scored exceptionally low in both categories. When we examine the content of the sentences 
coded as normative, we find that the stakeholder report made brief reference to the rights of all 
city residents to “digital inclusion and digital empowerment” (SFDTIS, 2007, p. 6).  In contrast, 
the citizens rooted their claims in appeals to equal access to broadband, equal economic 
opportunity, and equal privacy protections for all Internet users, while the activists raised a broad 
range of norms that might underwrite increased Internet access, including broadcasters’ public 
interest obligations, public rights to the spectrum, treaty obligations to Native Americans, the 
public good, and a healthy democracy.  
Beyond highlighting major shortcomings, the coding also reveals other meaningful 
differences in the reports’ reasoning patterns.  For example, in addition to the fact that all three 
groups differed in their attention to evidence, we also find important differences in the kind of 
evidence contained in the reports (not shown in Table 2).  Stakeholders focused almost entirely 
on presenting evidence in the form of statistics and research findings (92.90 percent of all 
evidence sentences), most of which documented which demographic groups had the lowest 
levels of broadband access and the importance of broadband for educational, economic, and 
other benefits. In contrast, while the activists devoted just over 6 percent of the sentences in their 
report to evidence, most of this evidence was stories (13.80 percent) and especially testimony 
(68.80 percent) about experiences and lessons learned in local projects to increase Internet 
access.   
In our approach, publicity’s legitimacy depends not only on including the elements of 
deliberative argumentation but also on how well they cohere into a clear overall argument. For 
example, the top portion of Table 2 shows that the reports differed in their attention to 
conclusions, with the activists devoting a significantly lower percentage of their report to 
  
conclusions than did citizens and stakeholders.  However, the key sign of high quality 
deliberative argumentation is not necessarily the sheer percentage of conclusions, but the extent 
to which they are grounded in reasons, evidence, norms, and comparison with opposing views.   
This approach to assessing the quality of argumentation is summarized in the middle 
portion of Table 2.  The sentence-level coherence measures present the percentage of the 
conclusions in each document that could be plausibly linked to the other categories, at least once, 
anywhere in the document.  The results show that while the activists devoted a lower portion of 
their document to conclusions, their conclusions were often supported by the other categories of 
argumentation, including the highest percentages of conclusions supported by reasons, norms, 
and mentions of opposing views.  The stakeholder document was least successful at supporting 
conclusions with reasons.  Because the citizen document included no evidence, both the activist 
and stakeholder documents scored much stronger than the citizens on the link between 
conclusions and evidence.  However, when we ask whether conclusions are linked to either one 
reason or one piece of evidence, all three documents are approximately equal.  
Differences in the documents are most profound in how they treat opposing views.  
Because the stakeholder report includes no opposing views, none of its conclusions can be linked 
to opposing perspectives, while in both the citizen and activist documents, approximately one-
quarter of the conclusions could be compared with an opposing view.  When the citizens and 
activists considered opposing views, they tended to present broadly-framed alternative views that 
countered multiple conclusions. For example, although the citizen report called for city 
governments to build public broadband infrastructure, the report also acknowledged that “local 
governments can be less efficient than private companies in operating networks” (BBFA, 2006, 
p. 2).  The activists contrasted their efforts on behalf of “freedom to innovate” with 
  
telecommunications’ companies’ “opposing agenda” designed to “Control/limit threatening 
innovation and competition” (NAF/CIMA, 2006, p. 2).   
However, these examples illustrate important differences between the activist and citizen 
documents in the level of respect they showed for opposing views (not shown in tables).  The 
activist document tended to present opposing views as illegitimate – 70 percent of conclusions 
associated with any opposing view were linked to a counter-argument that was depicted in 
pejorative language not likely to be used publicly by the group’s opponents (e.g., “threatening 
innovation”).  By contrast, in the citizen document, 69 percent of conclusions were accompanied 
by an opposing view presented as worthy of consideration and no conclusions were compared 
with illegitimate opposing views.   
To what extent, then, were the conclusions in each report supported by the other 
indicators of argumentation? Table 2 presents several different summary measures that shed light 
on this question. Fully supported conclusions are linked to at least one form of reasoning (either 
evidence or other kinds of reasons) and one norm and one opposing view.  Partially supported 
conclusions are linked to at least one reason/evidence or one norm or one opposing view.  
Unsupported conclusions are linked to no reasons/evidence, norms, or opposing views.   
Using this standard, each report partially supports a large percentage of conclusions, but 
no report fully supports all its claims.
9
  The activist report had the highest percentage of fully 
supported conclusions, followed by the citizens and then by the stakeholder report, which 
supported no conclusions fully because the document contained no opposing views.  These 
differences in levels of full support are all significant at the .05 level or better.  Nonetheless, even 
in the activist document, barely over one-third of the conclusions are fully supported.
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  And in 
all three documents, a significant percentage of the conclusions were accompanied by no support 
  
whatsoever, with the percentage of unsupported claims exceeding 20 percent in the stakeholder 
report.  To the extent that deliberative publicity ought to explain why a group supports its policy 
conclusions, all three documents could be improved.  
What kinds of conclusions tended to be stated without support? Across all reports, some 
conclusions were unsupported because they were ambiguous (e.g., the activist report’s 
recommendation that movement actors should “focus on surfacing knowledge needs” 
[NAF/CIMA, 2006, p. 17]), while others were simply unaccompanied by any further discussion. 
Many of these latter claims involved recommendations of specific strategies. In the citizen 
report, unsupported strategies tended to focus on how cities should provide outreach and training 
to people who did not know how to use the Internet (by partnering with non-profits and 
educational institutions, creating a traveling “Techmobile,” and the like). In the activist report, 
strategies without rationales frequently focused on how to manage the power relations between 
the national think tank that organized the deliberation and the participants from local advocacy 
groups, such as how the local groups could play a more active role in setting the agenda for 
future meetings.  The stakeholder report contained two main gaps in reasoning: why the city 
should offer different tiers of broadband service (including a no-frills tier for free and advanced 
services for higher rates) and the roles in managing access to the network that would be played 
by a city agency, two private companies that would build and manage the network, and various 
partner organizations that would offer training to new Internet users.  While both the citizen and 
the activist reports included a good deal of argumentation for and against the idea of cities 
building and controlling their own broadband networks and whether such networks should 
provide tiered or equal services, in the stakeholder report these decisions were simply announced 
without justification. 
  
We also asked coders to make other summary judgments of the extent to which the 
connections between conclusions and the other elements of argumentation were both proximate 
and logical.  In this step, coders stepped back from the sentence-level analysis to consider the 
relationship between conclusions and the elements of argumentation in the document as a whole. 
These judgments are presented in the bottom portion of Table 2, and they reveal a slightly 
different set of publicity concerns.  While the activist document had the highest percentage of 
fully supported conclusions, these connections were nonetheless more difficult to discern than in 
the other two reports.  In part, this is because of the report’s structure, which began with a 
section on “Why Telecommunication Matters” filled with reasons and evidence, then presented a 
“Public Policy Agenda” and “Strategies for Action,” which were almost all conclusions about 
articulating demands, how to frame issues, identifying allies and opponents, and identifying 
resources.  As important, each section tended to present long lists of bullet-pointed text written in 
fairly dense language that presumed background knowledge of debates over spectrum policy.  As 
a result, coders found it difficult to link conclusions in the latter part of the document with the 
fragmentary rationales provided in the opening section.  In contrast, the citizens and stakeholder 
reports were organized by topic (e.g., how broadband could be made more accessible to the 
disabled, to non-English speakers, and so on) and each section integrated conclusions with 
supporting reasoning, alternative views, and, in the citizen report, with norms.  These reports 
were written in a more accessible style that presumed little prior knowledge of the topic.  If we 
think of the reports as jigsaw puzzles, reading the activist work was like putting together a 
partially disassembled puzzle in which most of the elements could be pieced together with effort 
(at least by those with some prior knowledge of the topic), while reading the other two reports 
  
was like encountering fully assembled puzzles, even if a few more pieces (especially evidence 
and opposing views) were missing. 
Transparency 
Next we turn our attention from argumentation to the question of transparency.  The top 
line of Table 3 contains the percentage of sentences in each document coded as including some 
element of transparency.  The results show that the activist report devoted six times more 
attention to transparency than the stakeholder report and citizen report, mainly because the 
activists included a two-page introduction about the group’s purpose and three pages of 
biographies of the participants.   But again, the percentage of sentences is only part of the story.  
The remaining portion of Table 3 shows the extent to which different elements of transparency 
were present in each document.  The checklist shows that the activist report not only devoted 
many sentences to transparency but also revealed many different aspects of control, design, 
intended influence, and fidelity, addressing nearly 70 percent of the transparency categories.  But 
Table 3 makes clear that the citizen document also practiced many kinds of transparency, despite 
the low number of sentences devoted to this category.  Thus, it is possible to achieve a relatively 
high level of disclosure, even when the sheer number of transparency sentences is relatively low.  
The stakeholder document, by contrast, included few sentences about transparency and also 
scored very low on the checklist of transparency elements, with less than 20 percent of the 
elements included.  None of the documents mentioned evaluation of either the deliberation itself 
or the deliberators.   





Strong levels of intercoder reliability demonstrate that our indicators can be used to 
measure many aspects of the legitimacy of deliberative publicity.  While our small sample means 
that we cannot generalize to reports by citizen, activist or stakeholder groups more broadly, our 
comparative findings demonstrate that these measures can reveal significant contrasts in the 
quality of publicity in these three reports.   
Our results also lend support to the idea that in content analysis, multiple measures can 
reveal different views of the documents’ strengths and weaknesses.  Our research strategy 
involved sentence-level coding into categories, an assessment of the relationship between the 
categories in each document, and several document-level summary evaluations.  These multiple 
views allow us to see deliberative publicity from several useful angles.  For example, while the 
activist report offered the largest proportion of fully-supported conclusions, the quality of that 
support was compromised by the report’s disjointed structure and fragmentary logic. And 
although the citizen document devoted many fewer sentences to transparency than the activist 
report, those sentences revealed about as many different facets of the deliberative process as the 
activist report.  
This pilot study also illustrates one way the LPI can be used to assess publicity’s 
contribution to a deliberative democratic system. Of the three groups, the stakeholder task force 
focused most on communicating conclusions, grounding them most fully in research or statistical 
evidence, and least fully in norms and consideration of opposing views. The government-
organized task force report seemed most successful at expressing agreements among contending 
community leaders and conveying issue expertise, yet least successful at addressing the moral 
rationale for equal access to broadband and grappling with alternative views. The document also 
  
demonstrates the lowest level of transparency in the sample. Thus, the report does not seem to 
address fully the criticisms of stakeholder democracy for being overly technocratic and posing a 
danger of co-opting the voices of weaker participants in a government-imposed consensus 
(because no disagreements within the group are discussed).  A deliberative democrat would 
likely urge the authors of such reports to pay greater attention to differences of opinion 
(especially within the task force), to the normative bases of the proposal, and to disclosing the 
process by which stakeholders were consulted.  
The citizen report also contradicted and confirmed some frequent claims about the 
contributions of civic deliberation to democracy.  The report excelled at reason-giving, making 
normative claims, and paying attention to opposing views (at least relative to the low level of 
norms and alternative views found in all three documents).  In addition, the opposing views were 
presented respectfully, rather than as unworthy of consideration.  These findings run counter to 
the fears expressed by skeptics of deliberative democracy that citizens are less capable of 
communicating their views to others rationally, less aware of their own value commitments, and 
less willing to contend with disagreement than other policy actors.  This case supports prior 
claims that citizen forums are more likely than technical and policy experts to consider the 
ethical impacts of policy proposals (e.g., Sclove, 1996).  In addition, it is surprising that the 
report of citizen deliberation paid significantly greater attention to opposing views than a 
government-organized stakeholder report, given that the latter report included input from a 
diverse range of interested parties and that public policy analysts are trained to demonstrate 
discursively that they have considered trade-offs, unintended consequences, and potential 
objections to policy options (Bardach, 2009).  While deliberative democracy’s skeptics focus on 
survey data indicating that citizens rarely gravitate toward political discussion with those who 
  
hold contrasting views on issues (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), our example report jibes with 
a body of research (summarized in Gastil, 2008) indicating that well-structured deliberative 
forums can help participants to wrestle with and resolve opposing views. However, because the 
report included no evidence, it also failed to challenge the skeptics’ view that citizen deliberation 
is ill-informed.  Publicity of citizen deliberation such as this report could enhance its legitimacy 
for its intended audiences by including examples of evidence considered by the deliberators. 
The activist report contributed unique kinds of evidence in the form of stories and 
testimony, which have been seen as more accessible forms of evidence for less educated and 
empowered citizens (Young, 2000), so it is somewhat surprising that it was a group of 
professional policy advocates who conveyed these kinds of evidence more than the citizen group.  
The activist report also offered extraordinary attention to its own transparency.  It may surprise 
those who criticize interest group politics as self-absorbed and sectarian that this report was 
much more concerned with revealing the dynamics of the deliberation, including how it was 
controlled and designed, as well as its intended influence. The report took pains to demonstrate 
inclusion of diverse interests (in this case, of representatives of the full range of social groups 
with the least access to broadband). But the activist document also scored the lowest in summary 
measures of the coherence of the argument, in part because it was organized largely around long 
lists of demands and political strategies, and because it presumed a great deal of prior knowledge 
of the issue. And while the document did present opposing views, it often framed them as 
illegitimate. These limitations may fail to dispel concerns that activist deliberation is insular and 
polarizing. While we do not suggest that activists ought always to respect opponents’ views, 
reports such as this one, even if aimed at an audience of other activists, may achieve greater 
legitimacy by addressing disagreements within the group more explicitly (and, presumably, they 
  
would do so respectfully). Reports like this one could also challenge themselves to explain 
clearly those shared meanings and arguments that are taken for granted within the group, even 
for an audience of other activists, who were unable to take part in the discussion and who may 
not be as knowledgeable about the issues as the participants. 
Why did each report practice publicity as it did?  While an exhaustive exploration of this 
question would require more space than we have here, our interviews with forum organizers and 
our own involvement in the citizen forum suggest several factors were especially influential: the 
organizers’ goals and issue framings, the intended audience, the decision rule used by the group 
to arrive at conclusions, and the authoring process for each report.
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  For example, the goal of the 
city telecommunication agency that organized the stakeholder task force was to gather advice 
from this group about how a planned municipal broadband network could best reach underserved 
residents, but not whether the city should build the network, who should operate it, or how its 
tiers of service should be priced.  Therefore, the city’s policy about network operation and 
pricing was publicized without a supporting rationale and the opposing views expressed within 
the committee on these contentious issues were not reported because the city staff member who 
authored the report was empowered to frame this debate as outside the group’s purview.  
Because the report was intended to justify the city’s policy to the public, the author emphasized 
research and statistics about which groups had the lowest levels of Internet access and the 
benefits that would accrue to the city if tax dollars were invested in connecting these underserved 
groups. 
The purpose of the citizen report, by contrast, was to communicate to policy experts the 
views of residents from groups without broadband access.  The need to address a policy 
community divided over whether cities should invest in providing broadband networks 
  
influenced the report to present alternative views neutrally or with respect, rather than dismissing 
the views of those who opposed municipal broadband. Amplifying citizens’ voices led the 
organizers to choose the consensus conference format, in which a broader scope of issues was 
open to deliberation than in the stakeholder task force, starting with the question of whether 
cities ought to build their own networks, and, if so, who should operate them, and what should be 
done to maximize access to them. The forum followed the typical decision-making and authoring 
process in a consensus conference, which includes a line-by-line assessment by participants of 
draft report language culled from the deliberators’ conversations, retaining only the language that 
all deliberators approve.  This authoring process and report structure tends to enhance coherence 
between conclusions and rationales by presenting them proximally, by topic area, for the full 
group’s review.  However, because the report was patterned after examples of other consensus 
conferences that did not discuss evidence, the organizers failed to prompt participants to buttress 
their arguments with the research and statistics provided in briefing materials, or with members’ 
own experiences, which were discussed extensively in deliberation and increased participants’ 
issue knowledge (Authors, 2009).  Here is another reminder that publicity can be influenced 
more by authoring decisions than by the quality of the underlying deliberation. 
The activist report was intended to summarize local organizers’ advice to a national think 
tank on broadband policy work and to build an advocacy coalition among them and other 
activists beyond the group.  As part of this goal, the organizers asked participants to “provide 
stories, data, and examples of actual community experiences that can be used to support and 
bolster public interest positions in spectrum/wireless policy advocacy” (NAF/CIMA, 2006, p. 1). 
This kind of evidence was sought, and reported, to help activists communicate the importance of 
a potentially abstract issue that was not at the top of the public or media agenda.  The group was 
  
also asked to identify opposing views raised by private telecommunications companies in order 
to hone arguments that could be used against the companies, some of which involved appeals to 
broadly-shared norms (such as equal opportunity and the public right to control the spectrum).  
However, the report’s primary audience was not the public, but other advocates, who were 
presumed to be highly knowledgeable about broadband policy and to agree with the participants 
on major issues. Thus, the report was less clear and coherent about walking readers through the 
rationales for its conclusions. The decision rule and authoring process also influenced the 
report’s coherence. Long lists of bullet points aggregated participants’ conclusions and reasoning 
more than prioritizing their views or resolving disagreements among them. In particular, 
unresolved tensions between the think tank organizers and the grassroots participants over who 
should lead the coalition were revealed in the unsupported conclusions about how the group 
should manage the agenda in future meetings.  At the same time, the think tank’s need to 
demonstrate its commitment to inclusive and egalitarian politics seems to have inspired much of 
the report’s transparency, which focused especially on demonstrating the diversity of the 
grassroots participants who were consulted and how the organizers’ solicited their views.  
Conclusion 
We have argued that publicity is an important and little researched component of 
deliberative democracy and demonstrated how our measures of legitimate publicity could be 
useful for assessing some frequent empirical claims about the strengths and weaknesses of 
several common deliberative forums: government-stakeholder task forces, activist strategy 
groups, and citizen consensus conferences.  While our small sample did not allow us to 
generalize about how these groups communicate publicly in all instances, this pilot study yielded 
practical advice about how each report could practice more legitimate deliberative publicity, 
  
indicating how our measures could be used as a guide by those who author such publicity. These 
results also illustrate the first steps in a research agenda that could fruitfully assess the role of 
publicity as a potential moderating variable between the quality of group deliberation and its 
effects on public opinion and political outcomes.   
This kind of research would begin by identifying the factors in the deliberative process 
that account for quality publicity. The main challenge for such research is that the outcomes of 
deliberation are overdetermined by myriad variables of control, design, intended influence, and 
issue selection (Fung, 2003).  Based on our observations in this study, it seems especially 
important to study the ways in which publicity is influenced by the organizers’ goals and issue 
framings, intended audiences, the decision rule used in deliberation, and the authoring process. 
Such research could expand its focus beyond final reports to consider all forms of external 
communication by deliberative policy bodies throughout their lifecycles.  The response to these 
groups from attentive policy actors is likely shaped by whether they perceive such processes as 
legitimate and well-informed from the start.   
There is also a need to study publicity’s effects on the larger deliberative system, a 
central concern of deliberative democracy (Gastil & Levine, 2005). Such research could identify 
which elements of external communicative quality are most persuasive for policy actors, the 
news media, and the public.  This research might incorporate categories from the literature on 
policy making as rhetorical persuasion (e.g., Majone, 1989), such as the goodness of fit between 
reasons and the views of intended audiences for reports, or the credibility of sources of 
information cited for particular audiences, as well as how civic deliberation is filtered through 
journalistic norms (e.g., Parkinson, 2006b).  
  
How significant is it for audiences to know a group’s rationale for its positions at all? For 
example, Deliberative Polls are fairly transparent about many aspects of the design and control 
of the deliberative process, but have been criticized for merely reporting participants’ opinions in 
the aggregate before and after deliberation rather than revealing much about participants’ reasons 
and evidence for their opinions and for any shifts in them.  A lively theoretical debate on whether 
this undermines the external legitimacy and effectiveness of deliberative polls relative to other 
deliberative forums (Fishkin & Luskin, 2006; Parkinson, 2006b, 2006c), could be addressed 
through comparative research on how each is communicated and perceived by different 
audiences. 
Is transparency more important than argumentation for persuading audiences, and if so, 
what kinds of disclosures? For example, Cutler et al. (2008) show that in the popular referendum 
on the political redistricting proposal generated by the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, 
citizens who lacked information about the details of the proposal based their vote on whether 
they saw elements of the Assembly’s process as legitimate, such as including people like them, 
informing them well about the issues, and so on. Research has shown that voters who know little 
about the details of ballot propositions can use shortcuts to make decisions that emulate those of 
well-informed voters (e.g., Lupia, 1994). Can citizens similarly use brief information about a 
deliberative process as a reliable cue to gauge the validity of a group’s conclusions?  If so, 
perhaps the procedural theories of deliberation are more relevant than we think. 
Research on publicity’s influences could also help address additional questions about the 
normative and practical performance of different components of the deliberative system, 
especially some trade-offs that are often seen as endemic to it.  For example, there may be a 
tension between the publicity and internal legitimacy of deliberation. When deliberators are 
  
highly polarized, secrecy can foster greater trust, sincerity, and empathy among them (Warren, 
2007). This can especially hold true among citizen groups discussing difficult racial issues 
(Cramer Walsh, 2007) and in legislatures (Steiner, et al., 2004).  But the value of publicity for 
democracy increases when participants in deliberation are empowered representatives who can 
enact policy directly (because publicity makes them more accountable) and when there is a 
danger that some with legitimate claims may be excluded (because publicity makes groups more 
inclusive). Thus, some argue that even when deliberation in direct decision-making bodies is 
cloaked, the process and reasoning generally should be communicated afterward (Parkinson, 
2006a; Warren, 2007).  Research could help answer whether and how the quality of 
communication about necessarily secret deliberations can boost their perceived legitimacy and 
influence among non-participants.   
Research could also address whether trade-offs between the influence and internal 
legitimacy of deliberation may be overcome in part through external communication.  Warren 
(2007) notes that deliberative democrats tend to assume that citizen deliberators with a stronger 
guarantee of influence on policy (often because they are convened by government) will be more 
committed to learning about the full scope and depth of issues and will offer more detailed 
conclusions, but that these deliberators may engage in excessively strategic reasoning and cede 
more independence in crafting their proposals to fit political expediency (compromising internal 
legitimacy).  This has long been a concern of social movement participants in state-sponsored 
forums (Dryzek, 2000). Is co-optation always the price of influence?  Close study of how civic 
forums that maximize both their independence and impact communicate with the public, news 
media, stakeholders, and decision-makers might help to identify optimal institutional designs and 
communicative practices for civic deliberation.  
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Table 1. Intercoder Reliability 
 
 Percent Agreement Krippendorff’s 
Alpha 
Argumentation   
Recommendations 98.35 0.947 
Reasons 96.69 0.929 
Evidence   100.00 1.000 
Normativity 99.56 0.969 
Opposing Views 100.00 1.000 
Transparency 100 1.000 
Other Material 93.35 0.867 
   
Coherence   
Reasons 98.80 0.956 
Evidence 89.16 0.781 
Norms 90.36 0.807 
Opposing Views – Illegitimate 95.18 0.792 
Opposing Views – Legitimate 95.18 0.880 
Opposing Views – Neutral 92.77 0.788 
 
N=121 sentences coded in the test of argumentation categories (results for Norms based on 226 
sentences coded, as the small number of sentences that made normative claims required a larger 




Table 2. Argumentation 
 Citizens Activists Stakeholders 
Emphasis: Sentence-level 
% of sentences coded as … 



































% of conclusions connected to at least one … 











Reason or Evidence 79.3 82.8 79.5 







 % of conclusions ...    






Partially Supported 86.2 86.2 79.5 
Unsupported 13.8 13.8 20.5 
Coherence: Document-level 
Summary judgments of how clearly 
   
  
conclusions linked to … 
Reasons High Medium High 
Evidence None Low High 
Norms High Medium Medium 
Opposing Views High Medium None 
Percent Coded High 75.0 0.0 50.0 
 
a
Percentage is significantly different from activists at p<.05 
c
Percentage is significantly different from citizens at p<.05 
s
Percentage is significantly different from stakeholders at p<.05 
Note: Statistical significance determined with two-tailed difference of proportions tests.  
Significant differences are bolded, with the appropriate point of comparison indicated by the 
superscript. For sentence-level measures of emphasis and coherence, percentages for any one 







Table 3. Transparency 
 Citizens Activists Stakeholders 






Control    
Organizers’ Mission No Yes Yes 
Funding/Sponsorship Yes Yes No 
Partnerships Yes Yes Yes 
Design    
Participant Selection Yes Yes No 
Participant Representativeness Yes Yes Yes 
Agenda No Yes No 
Structure and Facilitation Yes Yes No 
Deliberative Format Yes No No 
Decision Rule No No No 
Decision Dynamics No Yes No 
Intended Influence    
Purpose Yes Yes No 
Audiences Yes Yes No 
Evaluation    
Deliberation No No No 
Participants No No No 
Fidelity    
Authorization  Yes Yes No 
  
Accountability Yes No No 









Percentage is significantly different from activists at p<.05; 
c
Percentage is significantly different from citizens at p<.05; 
s
Percentage is significantly different from stakeholders at p<.05. 
Note: Statistical significance determined with two-tailed difference of proportions tests.  





                                                 
Notes 
1
 While both dialogue and discussion are valuable to democracy, and groups must often engage in them before they 
can proceed to deliberate over solutions, we follow the trend in the literature to distinguish these kinds of talk 
because deliberative theory demands greater publicity from those who aim to influence public opinion or policy 
directly than from those who engage in dialogue or educative discussion (Warren, 2007).   
2
 Recent examples of high-profile civic forums attacked, fairly or not, for both their process and recommendations 
include the British Columbia Citizens Assembly, in which citizens were recruited to devise plans for political 
redistricting that were put to a popular vote (Warren & Pearse, 2008) and the AmericaSpeaks: Our Budget, Our 
Economy project, which convened 3,500 Americans in small groups to form policy recommendations for the US 
President’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (http://usabudgetdiscussion.org/national-
town-meeting-results/). The BC Citizens Assembly proposal illustrates the importance of publicity to other citizens. 
Cutler et al. (2008) show that citizens who knew more about the Assembly’s process and proposal were more likely 
to vote for the citizen-devised redistricting plan in the 2005 popular referendum. Yet the proposal narrowly failed to 
garner the required 60 percent supermajority of voters in part because less than 60 percent of the public knew 
anything about the Assembly or its proposal.  The AmericaSpeaks case shows the importance of publicity to interest 
groups. Liberal interest groups attacked the citizen deliberation even before its results were published for being 
partially sponsored, and allegedly manipulated, by a conservative foundation. 
3
 This definition does not depend on a group achieving consensus; it includes policy positions endorsed by a 
majority of participants after deliberation, such as those often reported by Deliberative Polls. 
4
 One of the authors co-organized the citizen consensus conference, while the other author served as the external 
evaluator.  The external evaluator conducted the interviews for this article with the organizers of each deliberative 
process.   
5
 While stakeholder and citizen forums are widely recognized as typical sites of deliberation, theory and research 
have paid less attention to the role of deliberation within social movements.  Nonetheless, deliberative theory has 
long recognized civil society organizations as unique and legitimate contributors to deliberative democracy (Cohen, 
1989; Dryzek, 2000; Habermas, 1996).  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
6
 The principle of selection in the consensus conference was somewhat different than normal.  Most such 
conferences aim to recruit a group that is roughly representative of the community in demographic, occupational, 
ideological, and other terms, although such a small group cannot form a representative sample in the social scientific 
sense.  In contrast, the broadband consensus conference formed a panel whose participants were members of at least 
one group that was least likely to have broadband access at the time, such as low-income people, the disabled, 
African-Americans, Latinos, and rural residents.   
7
 Because the activist document was much longer than the others, we employed a random sample of approximately 
75 percent of the conclusions in the document in the second stage of coding.   
8
 Table 1 contains measures of Krippendorff’s Alpha, but the results are essentially identical – never varying by 
more than .001 – if we employ other measures of intercoder reliability, such as Cohen’s Kappa or Scott’s Pi. 
9
 These measures of support represent a relatively low bar.  The elements of argumentation given in support of the 
conclusion could occur anywhere in the document, not necessarily in the same section as the conclusion.
  
Nor does 
this measure reflect the total number of reasons (evidence, opposing views, etc.) in favor of any conclusion. 
10
Even if the standard of linking each conclusion to a norm or an opposing view sets a high bar, Table 2 shows that 
in the three documents taken as a whole, approximately 20 percent of the conclusions could not be connected to a 
reason or piece of evidence.  
11
 It may be objected that the issue at stake also influences publicity. For example, there may have been few 
normative claims in each report studied here because Internet access is more of a technical or economic issue than a 
moral one. However, we think that deliberators’ approach to issues depends largely on forum organizers’ goals and 
issue framings. Broadband access, for example, involves complex questions about the optimal technology and 
economic model that will best reach all potential users, as well as obvious questions about distributive justice, 
because broadband access affects access to education, jobs and job training, public services, etc.  One could organize 
a forum exclusively about the technical, economic, or social justice aspects of the issue (as one could about abortion 
or tax policy). Thus, the organizers’ goals and issue framings seem more significant than any “inherent” qualities of 
an issue. 
